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Managing Charter Equality Rights:
The Supreme Court of Canada’s
Disposition of Leave to Appeal
Applications in Section 15 Cases,
1989-2010
Bruce Ryder* and Taufiq Hashmani**

I. INTRODUCTION
When scholars study the work of the Supreme Court of Canada, we
typically focus our attention on the Court’s written opinions. In this volume of papers drawn from Osgoode Hall Law School’s annual
Constitutional Cases conference, as in legal writing and analysis more
generally, scholars carefully parse the Court’s rulings — the words with
which the justices have chosen to speak. We pay less attention to what
the Court has chosen not to say. But the Court’s silences may speak more
loudly than its words. The Court has the power to control the cases it will
hear through the process of deciding whether to grant leave to appeal.
Through the leave process, the Court decides when it will speak and
when it will remain silent. Excavating how the Court has gone about exercising the power to choose which issues to address strikes us as an
important task of scholarship.
The existing scholarship on the leave to appeal process tends to focus
on the general approach taken by the Court, as well as general trends in
the number of leave applications and their disposition by the Court.1 Less
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See Brian A. Crane & Henry S. Brown, “Leave to Appeal Applications: The 1988-89
Term” (1990) 2 S.C.L.R. 483 (and subsequent reports published annually in the Supreme Court Law
Review); Henry S. Brown, Supreme Court of Canada Practice 2010 (Scarborough, ON: Thomson
Carswell, 2009); Roy B. Flemming, Tournament of Appeals: Granting Judicial Review in Canada
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004) [hereinafter “Flemming”]; Donald R. Songer, The Transformation of
the Supreme Court of Canada: An Empirical Examination (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1
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study has been undertaken of the Court’s handling of leave applications
in specific areas of the law. This understudied part of the Court’s work
can provide revealing information about the issues the Court does and
does not want to address.
This paper seeks to add to our understanding of the Court’s work by
conducting a close examination of how it has disposed of leave applications in cases involving alleged violations of the equality rights in section
15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.2 We were drawn to
this topic in part because the Court’s relative silence on Charter equality
rights in recent years has been more notable than what it has said in its
rulings on section 15. For example, in its 2009 rulings that are the focus
of this volume, the Court summarily dismissed section 15 claims in three
rulings preoccupied with other legal issues.3 In each case, equality rights
were a sideshow to the main event.
We were also drawn to this topic because of our awareness, from following equality rights jurisprudence and scholarship4 closely, that section
15 claims are at the moment a rapidly diminishing feature of the Canadian legal landscape,5 and that the courts are significantly more likely to
dismiss section 15 claims than they were in the past.6 Not so long ago, in
1997, the Supreme Court declared that “[t]he rights enshrined in s. 15(1)
2008) [hereinafter “Songer”], c. 3, “Setting the Agenda”; Ian Greene et al., Final Appeal: DecisionMaking in Canadian Courts of Appeal (Toronto: Lorimer, 1998), at 107-12; Ian Bushnell, “Leave to
Appeal Applications to the Supreme Court of Canada” (1982) 3 S.C.L.R. 479; Bertha Wilson,
“Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada” (1983) 4 Advocates’ Q. 1; Robert G. Richards,
“Motions for Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada” (1979-1981) 2 Advocates’ Q. 460.
2
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
3
C. (A.) v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), [2009] S.C.J. No. 30, [2009]
2 S.C.R. 181, at paras. 109-111 (S.C.C.), per Abella J.; at paras. 150-152, per McLachlin C.J.C.; at
paras. 226-231, per Binnie J. [hereinafter “C. (A.)”]; Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, [2009] S.C.J. No. 37, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567, at paras. 105-108 (S.C.C.), per McLachlin C.J.C.
[hereinafter “Hutterian Brethren”]; Ermineskin Indian Band and Nation v. Canada, [2009] S.C.J.
No. 9, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 222, at paras. 185-202 (S.C.C.), per Rothstein J. [hereinafter “Ermineskin”].
4
Two excellent collections of essays that address the contemporary challenges facing Canadian equality rights jurisprudence are Fay Faraday, Margaret Denike & M. Kate Stephenson, eds.,
Making Equality Rights Real: Securing Substantive Equality Under the Charter (Toronto: Irwin
Law, 2006) and Sheila McIntyre & Sanda Rodgers, eds., Diminishing Returns: Inequality and the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2006) (the same
essays also appear in (2006) 33 S.C.L.R. (2d) 1-412).
5
From 1989 to 2009, the number of reported judicial rulings disposing of claims alleging
violations of s. 15 of the Charter has hovered around an annual average of 40. In the first half of
2010, we have found only seven reported court rulings disposing of s. 15 claims.
6
Our data on all reported judicial rulings in s. 15 claims since 1989 reveal that the rate at
which courts find s. 15 claims to be established has dropped by close to 50 per cent in the 2004-2009
period compared to the previous 15 years.
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of the Charter are fundamental to Canada. They reflect the fondest
dreams, the highest hopes and finest aspirations of Canadian society.”7
Since then, Charter equality rights seem to inhabit a less exalted place in
the Canadian legal imagination. What has happened to the dreams, hopes
and aspirations enshrined in section 15? To what extent have they been
realized? To what extent and in what ways are litigants continuing to
pursue the transformational promise of section 15?
While these broader questions form a backdrop to our ongoing investigations, we cannot begin to answer them in this paper. Our modest aim
here is to shed some light on the Supreme Court of Canada’s role in guiding the development of Charter equality rights jurisprudence by focusing
on its decision-making record in leave to appeal applications in section
15 cases. To what extent has the Court’s interest in hearing section 15
appeals shifted over time? What Charter equality rights issues has the
Court chosen to address or not to address?
We will begin by briefly describing the leave to appeal process. We
will then describe the dataset of section 15 leave cases we have assembled, and the trends in section 15 grant rates it reveals over the course of
the past two decades. We will compare the decline in the rate at which
the Court grants leave to appeal in section 15 cases with the grant rate in
Charter cases generally, and will speculate about why the grant rate in
section 15 cases has declined more sharply in the past decade than it has
for Charter cases as a whole. We then turn to an examination of whether
the grant rate in section 15 cases, and the rate at which appeals are allowed when the Court does grant leave, differ depending on whether the
section 15 claim was found to be established at the Court of Appeal. In
both regards, our data reveal that the Court’s record leans heavily in favour of governments in section 15 cases. We conclude that the Supreme
Court has played a significant role, through its management of the appeal
process, in directing a restricted scope for Charter equality rights.

II. THE LEAVE TO APPEAL PROCESS
Apart from a significant minority of criminal appeals that reach the
Supreme Court as of right, and a small number of reference questions
directed to the Court by government, the Court exercises discretionary
control over its docket through the power to grant or dismiss applications
7
Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] S.C.J. No. 29, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, at para. 67 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Vriend”].
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for leave to appeal. First enacted in 1975, section 40(1) of the Supreme
Court Act8 empowers the Court to grant leave to appeal to a case when it
… is of the opinion that any question involved therein is, by reason of
its public importance or the importance of any issue of law or any issue
of mixed law and fact involved in that question, one that ought to be
decided by the Supreme Court or is, for any other reason, of such a
nature or significance as to warrant decision by it ...

As Songer has noted, “the statute does not define ‘public importance’
and the court has not published any clarifying guidelines”.9 Based on
interviews with and articles published by the justices, and the testimony
of former clerks, we know that the Court’s exercise of discretion on leave
applications is driven primarily by the need to develop or clarify the law
on issues of national importance. Leave is more likely to be granted
when issues have a national scope, as is the case with the interpretation
of federal statutes and the Constitution, particularly if there is a new
point of law or a need to resolve conflicting rulings from appellate
courts. Because of the limited number of appeals the Court can hear, correcting what the Court perceives to be mistakes in the lower courts is a
secondary consideration.10
Several kinds of silence characterize the leave process. First, the decision-making process on leave applications itself is shrouded in silence.
For reasons of economy dictated by the sheer volume of leave applications (over 500 annually in recent years), the Court issues no reasons
when it decides whether to grant or dismiss applications for leave to
appeal. As a result, the leave process is characterized by a lack of transparency and accountability. Apart from the statutory criterion of “public
importance”, a formulation similar in its breadth and vagueness to ones
the Court has condemned in other contexts as “standardless”,11 the Court
controls its docket according to undisclosed criteria.
Second, when the Court dismisses applications for leave to appeal, it
chooses to remain silent on the issues at stake. It chooses not to comment
on the dispute between the parties. It chooses not to use cases denied
leave to contribute to the development or clarification of the law. In addition, denials of leave close off the final avenue of appeal, thereby
8

R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26.
Songer, supra, note 1, at 46.
10
For an overview of the literature, see Songer, id., at 46-53.
11
See, e.g., R. v. Morales, [1992] S.C.J. No. 98, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 711 (S.C.C.) (holding that
the “public interest” is too vague and imprecise a standard to structure judicial discretion in bail
hearings in a meaningful way).
9
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confirming the precedential value of the appeal court rulings from which
leave to appeal was sought. The power to deny leave to appeal is thus an
important part of the Court’s role in supervising the development of Canadian law. As Flemming concluded in his recent book investigating the
leave to appeal process,
The administrative justification for this authority should not obscure the
power that comes from the exercise of this discretion. Agenda-setting
authority in a tournament of appeals constructed by the justices in
which they are the key players augments and bolsters their impact on
public policies and on the day-to-day concerns of government officials,
12
Parliament, and Canadian citizens.

III. DATASET OF SECTION 15 LEAVE CASES
Using Quicklaw, CanLII and the Supreme Court’s case information
database,13 we compiled a dataset consisting of all of the Court’s decisions
on leave to appeal applications in section 15 cases since September 1,
1989.14 We included a case in our dataset if it met the following criteria:
•

the lower courts addressed a claim alleging a violation of section 15
of the Charter, finding it to be established or not established;15

•

a party sought leave to appeal to the Court on the section 15 violation
issue; and

12

Flemming, supra, note 1, at 106.
We conducted searches on Quicklaw’s “Supreme Court of Canada Rulings on Applications for Leave to Appeal” database and on CanLII’s “Supreme Court of Canada – Applications for
Leave” database. We also used searches on Quicklaw and CanLII to compile a list of all appellate
rulings on s. 15 claims, and then searched the case information database on the Court’s website using
the names of the parties. After compiling cases from these three sources, we are confident that our
dataset represents a comprehensive record of the Court’s decision-making on s. 15 leave applications
(that otherwise meet our criteria of inclusion) since September 1, 1989.
14
We used the Court’s 1989-1990 Term as our starting point because judicial interpretation
of Charter equality rights was particularly chaotic prior to the Court’s first s. 15 ruling in Andrews v.
Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] S.C.J. No. 6, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Andrews”], released on February 2, 1989. To track patterns of decision-making in s. 15 leave applications over time, we decided to exclude the leave record in the doctrinally unstructured earliest days
of judicial interpretation of s. 15.
15
We characterize s. 15 claims as “established” at the Court of Appeal if the court found a
violation of s. 15 that was not demonstrably justified as a reasonable limit pursuant to s. 1. We characterize s. 15 claims as “not established” at the Court of Appeal if the court did not find a violation
of s. 15 or if the court found a violation of s. 15 that was demonstrably justified as a reasonable limit
pursuant to s. 1.
13

510

•

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d)

the Court granted or dismissed the application for leave to appeal
after September 1, 1989.

When we refer to “section 15 leave cases” or “section 15 leave applications”, we are referring to cases that meet these three criteria.
We adopted these three criteria of inclusion to meet our objective of
measuring patterns of Supreme Court decision-making over time on applications for leave to appeal from lower court rulings dealing with
alleged violations of section 15 of the Charter. We did not include cases
where section 15 is enlisted solely as an aid to the interpretation of a
statute or other legal rule. We did not include cases that involved arguments based on “equality values” (as opposed to equality rights). We did
not include cases involving alleged violations of non-constitutional
equality rights. Moreover, in an effort to focus our dataset on “genuine”
section 15 appeals, if an applicant alleged a violation of section 15 for
the first time as part of the leave to appeal application,16 we excluded the
case from our dataset.17 We made the same decision if a section 15 violation was alleged in the lower courts, but the courts did not address it. If
we had included these cases in our dataset, the grant rate in “genuine”
section 15 appeals would have been distorted.18
Using our criteria of inclusion, we generated a dataset consisting of
177 section 15 leave cases from 1989 to 2010. For each of these cases,
we recorded the following information:
•

whether the section 15 claim was established or not established at the
Court of Appeal;

•

whether the application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of
Canada was granted or dismissed;

16
This happens fairly regularly as applicants for leave strive to convince the Court that their
appeals raise issues of public importance. Some leave applicants take a “kitchen sink” approach,
thinking, mistakenly, that adding a constitutional issue or two will add gravitas to their leave applications.
17
Thus, for example, while leave was granted to argue s. 15 in Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] S.C.J. No. 9, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350 (S.C.C.), since none of the
proceedings below (involving the claimants Almrei, Charkaoui and Harkat) considered s. 15, the
case is not included in our dataset.
18
When a claimant seeks leave to appeal to argue a s. 15 violation, it is almost always denied if the s. 15 violation has not been considered in the lower courts. Examples of exceptions to the
general practice include Charkaoui, id., and R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79,
[2003] 3 S.C.R. 571 (S.C.C.) (in any case, in both cases the Court ended up devoting little attention
to the s. 15 arguments).

(2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d) MANAGING CHARTER EQUALITY RIGHTS

511

•

the date of the Supreme Court of Canada decision on the leave application; and

•

whether the Supreme Court of Canada allowed or dismissed the appeal on the section 15 issue.19

The full list of cases, and a summary of these features of each case,
appears in Appendix B below.

IV. TRENDS IN DECISION-MAKING IN SECTION 15 LEAVE CASES
The annual grant rate in section 15 leave applications is reproduced
in Appendix A, below. While the percentage of section 15 cases granted
leave fluctuates from year to year because of the small number of cases,
a more discernible pattern emerges if the grant rate in section 15 cases is
aggregated over five-year periods. From 1989 to 1994, the grant rate in
section 15 cases was 38.5 per cent and from 1994 to 1999, it was 47.1
per cent. The grant rate declined dramatically to 24.1 per cent from 1999
to 2004, and declined further, to 22 per cent, from 2004 to 2009. These
numbers are illustrated in Chart 1 below.

19
We did not record whether the Court allowed or dismissed the appeal on other grounds;
we focused exclusively on the result of the appeal on the question of whether a violation of s. 15 was
established.
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If one compares the numbers cumulatively by decade, from 1989 to
1999, the Court granted leave in 31 of 73, or 42.5 per cent, of section 15
cases; from 1999 to 2009, the Court granted leave in 22 of 95, or 23.2 per
cent, of section 15 cases. If one includes the partial data (see Appendices
A and B, below) available at the time of writing from the first 11 months
of the 2009-2010 Term (one in nine cases granted leave), the cumulative
grant rate in section 15 cases since 1999 has dipped to 22.1 per cent.
In sum, applicants for leave in section 15 cases in the late 1990s had
a close to even chance of being granted leave. Now, the odds of section
15 applicants being granted leave are less than one in four and the trend
towards increasingly longer odds is continuing. How can we explain the
decline of over 20 per cent in the grant rate for section 15 leave applications since the 1990s?
Part of the explanation lies in the fact that the Court’s grant rate in all
leave applications has declined steadily in recent decades as the number
of leave applications has increased. Between 1970 and 1990, the Court
granted leave to 25 to 35 per cent of leave applications.20 In the 1990s,
the grant rate declined from 22 per cent at the beginning of the decade to
13 per cent by its conclusion.21 The average grant rate in all leave applications through the 1990s was 15 per cent.22 The overall grant rate has
slipped even lower in recent years: from 2004 to 2009 it was 11.8 per
cent.23 In sum, over the period covered by our study, the Court has faced
increasing pressures on its docket that have forced it to be more selective
in granting leave to appeal. The grant rate in section 15 cases is significantly higher than the grant rate in leave applications as a whole.
However, most of the drop in the Court’s overall grant rate took place in
20

Flemming, supra, note 1, at 30.
Id., at 12.
Id.
23
This number is an aggregate of the data on leave applications from 2004 to 2009 drawn
from the annual reports published by Henry S. Brown and his co-authors. See Henry S. Brown &
Marion Van de Wetering, “Annual Report on Applications for Leave to Appeal to the Supreme
Court of Canada: The 2008-2009 Term” (2009) 48 S.C.L.R. (2d) 323 (67 of 517, or 13 per cent, of
applications granted); Henry S. Brown & Joshua A. Krane, “Annual Report on Applications for
Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada: The 2007-2008 Term” (2008) 43 S.C.L.R. (2d)
343 (53 of 576, or 9.2 per cent, of applications granted); Henry S. Brown & Maegan M. Hough,
“Annual Report on Applications for Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada: The 20062007 Term” (2007) 38 S.C.L.R. (2d) 557 (68 of 544 applications, or 12.5 per cent, of applications
granted); Henry S. Brown & Adam J. Patenaude, “Annual Report on Applications for Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada: The 2005-2006 Term” (2006) 35 S.C.L.R. (2d) 311 (44 of
494, or 8.9 per cent, of applications granted); Henry S. Brown, Brian A. Crane & M. Warren Mucci,
“Annual Report on Applications for Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada: The 20042005 Term” (2005) 30 S.C.L.R. (2d) 423 (91 of 595, or 15.3 per cent, of applications granted).
21
22
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the 1990s; since then it has declined relatively slowly. On the other hand,
with section 15 cases, the grant rate was at its highest in the late 1990s.
The sharp decline in section 15 grant rates has occurred in the past decade, whereas most of the decline in the Court’s overall leave granting
rate took place earlier, in the 1990s.
It is also helpful to consider our data on declining section 15 grant
rates in relation to changes over time in the Court’s grant rate in Charter
cases as a whole. Since 1990, Brian A. Crane, Henry S. Brown and their
co-authors have published annual data in the Supreme Court Law Review on grant rates in various categories of cases, including criminal and
non-criminal Charter cases.24 Chart 2 below aggregates their data over
five-year periods to depict the decline in the grant rate in all Charter
cases (both criminal and non-criminal) since 1989.

Source: Compiled from data in Brian A. Crane and Henry S. Brown et al., annual reports on applications for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, Supreme Court Law Review, 1990 to
2009.

As Chart 2 depicts, the grant rate in Charter leave applications as a
whole has declined at a relatively steady pace over the past 20 years,
from a high of 23.8 per cent from 1989-1994, to a low of 15 per cent
from 2004 to 2009. If one compiles the total leave numbers by decade,
from 1989 to 1999 the Court granted leave in 145 of 632, or 22.9 per
cent, of Charter cases; from 1999 to 2009, the Court granted leave in 131
of 742, or 17.7 per cent, of Charter cases.
24

The five most recent articles are cited, supra, note 23.
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The decline in the grant rate in Charter cases over time is understandable in light of the increasing pressures on the Court’s docket and
the declining need to provide guidance on Charter interpretation. The
need for the Court to establish the parameters of each section of the
Charter was more urgent in the early years of Charter adjudication. As
Charter jurisprudence has matured over the course of the past quarter
century — as the judiciary has added jurisprudential flesh to the Charter’s textual bones — one would expect the Court’s grant rate in Charter
leave applications to decline accordingly.
What is true of the Charter as a whole is also true of section 15
equality rights. In the 1990s, by granting leave to a high percentage of
section 15 cases, the Court responded to the pressing need to provide
guidance on a new and challenging area of the Charter. Developing the
contours of a substantive equality approach to the interpretation of section 15 was a shiny new judicial enterprise in the 1990s. Section 15 came
into force in 1985, three years after the rest of the Charter. The Court’s
first section 15 ruling, in 1989 in Andrews,25 put in place many of the
basic principles of interpretation. The details needed to be filled in to
provide further guidance to lower courts, governments and potential litigants. In short, the high section 15 grant rate in the 1990s was in large
part attributable to the need for the Court to develop nascent equality
rights doctrine in its first decade interpreting section 15. Moreover, as
divergent approaches to the interpretation of section 15 prevailed among
members of the Court through the 1990s,26 the high grant rate may have
been driven additionally by the Court’s attempts to bring stability and
coherence to its section 15 jurisprudence.
The Court finally united around a common approach to the interpretation of section 15 in 1999 in Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment
and Immigration).27 Justice Iacobucci, writing for a unanimous Court in
Law, set out a detailed test for the adjudication of section 15 claims.28
The Law ruling put the need to prove a violation of human dignity at the
heart of the section 15 test, guided by four “contextual factors”. While
Iacobucci J. acknowledged that a need for “further elaborations and
25

Supra, note 14.
These differences came to the fore in a trilogy of decisions released in 1995: Egan v.
Canada, [1995] S.C.J. No. 43, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 (S.C.C.); Miron v. Trudel, [1995] S.C.J. No. 44,
[1995] 2 S.C.R. 418 (S.C.C.) and Thibaudeau v. Canada, [1995] S.C.J. No. 42, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 627
(S.C.C.).
27
[1999] S.C.J. No. 12, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Law”].
28
Id., at para. 88.
26
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modifications” might emerge as the jurisprudence evolves,29 the sharp
decline in the grant rate in section 15 leave applications after 1999 likely
reflects, at least in part, the Court’s view that it had put in place a comprehensive approach that provided adequate guidance to lower courts.
We do not doubt that the decline in the grant rate in Charter cases
generally, and in section 15 cases specifically, can be explained at least in
part by the growth in Charter jurisprudence over time. Can the sharp decline in the grant rate in section 15 cases be explained entirely by this
maturation of the jurisprudence? In our view, it cannot, for two reasons.
First, as we will describe below, the section 15 jurisprudence remains
unsettled in important and troubling ways. Second, while the “maturing
jurisprudence” hypothesis should apply equally to section 15 and other
provisions of the Charter (with the exception that the section 15 jurisprudence started to develop three years later than the rest of the Charter), the
decline in the grant rate in section 15 cases has been more dramatic than
the decline in the grant rate in Charter cases as a whole.

V. THE UNSETTLED STATE OF SECTION 15 JURISPRUDENCE
As it turned out, the Law test did not achieve the stable and satisfying approach to the adjudication of section 15 claims the Court sought.
The decade following Law was a period of continuing turbulence in the
section 15 jurisprudence. The human dignity test introduced in Law
proved to be unpredictable and overly burdensome on claimants. Furthermore, in a series of rulings, particularly in Auton30 and Hodge,31 both
decided in 2004, the Court took a remarkably narrow and technical approach to the question of the “appropriate comparator group”, one that
had dire consequences for many section 15 claims. While commentators
were quick to point out these problems with the Law test and its sequelae, it was not until 2008, in R. v. Kapp,32 that the Court recognized the
need to address them. Chief Justice McLachlin and Abella J., writing the
joint opinion for the Court,33 acknowledged that
29

Id.
Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia, [2004] S.C.J. No. 71, [2004] 3 S.C.R.
657 (S.C.C.).
31
Hodge v. Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development), [2004] S.C.J. No. 60,
[2004] 3 S.C.R. 357 (S.C.C.).
32
R. v. Kapp, [2008] S.C.J. No. 42, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 483 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Kapp”].
33
Justice Bastarache wrote a separate concurrence based on s. 25 of the Charter. He noted
that he was “in complete agreement with the restatement of the test for the application of s.15 that is
adopted by the Chief Justice and Abella J. in their reasons for judgment.” Id., at para. 77.
30
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… as critics have pointed out, human dignity is an abstract and
subjective notion that, even with the guidance of the four contextual
factors, cannot only become confusing and difficult to apply; it has also
proven to be an additional burden on equality claimants, rather than the
philosophical enhancement it was intended to be. Criticism has also
accrued for the way Law has allowed the formalism of some of the
Court’s post-Andrews jurisprudence to resurface in the form of an
34
artificial comparator analysis focussed on treating likes alike.

Two footnotes included in this passage cited 19 scholarly sources —
an unusually large number — signalling the Court’s awareness of the
depth and breadth of concern about the ongoing problems in its section
15 jurisprudence. The Court’s diagnosis quoted above is clear: the section 15 test it created has turned out to be confusing, unpredictable,
overly burdensome and excessively formalistic. Yet, the Court in Kapp
did not offer a convincing prescription to cure these ills. It took three
modest steps to reformulate its approach to section 15(1). First, it simplified the statement of the test for establishing a violation of section 15(1),
producing a stripped-down version, strikingly minimalist in comparison
to the prolix statement in Law.35 The test for determining whether section
15(1) has been violated is now as follows:
(1) Does the law create a distinction based on an enumerated or
analogous ground? (2) Does the distinction create a disadvantage by
36
perpetuating prejudice or stereotyping?

Second, while the Court did not explicitly say so in Kapp, it now
seems clear, following the 2009 rulings in Ermineskin,37 C. (A.)38 and
Hutterian Brethren,39 that section 15 claimants no longer need to prove a
violation of human dignity.40 Third, the Court in Kapp suggested that the
four contextual factors set out in Law would continue to play a role in the
34

Id., at para. 22 (emphasis in original; footnotes omitted).
Supra, note 27.
Kapp, supra, note 32, at para. 17.
37
Supra, note 3.
38
Supra, note 3.
39
Supra, note 3.
40
The s. 15(1) test as stated in Kapp, supra, note 32, was reproduced in Ermineskin, supra,
note 3, at paras. 188 and 201, per Rothstein J.; C. (A.), supra, note 3, at para. 109, per Abella J., and
at para. 150, per McLachlin C.J.C.; and Hutterian Brethren, supra, note 3, at para. 106, per McLachlin C.J.C. Human dignity is conspicuously absent from the s. 15(1) discussion in these cases. Instead
of asking whether the claimant’s human dignity has been violated, the key question now is whether
“a distinction based on an enumerated or analogous ground creates a disadvantage by perpetuating
prejudice or stereotyping” (C. (A.), supra, note 3, at para. 150). Note that an explicit consideration of
the four contextual factors set out in Law was also absent from these three 2009 rulings.
35
36
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section 15(1) analysis, albeit in a reformulated manner that remains to be
worked out.41 Note that the Court has not yet given any indication of how
it will reformulate its approach to comparator groups, despite its acknowledgment of the artificiality and formalism of this part of the
section 15(1) test.42
Moreover, the Court reformulated its approach to section 15(2), the
ameliorative program clause, in Kapp. The Court held, for the first time,
that section 15(2) plays an “independent role”43 in protecting governmental ameliorative programs from being challenged pursuant to section
15(1) so long as the program has an ameliorative purpose and it targets a
disadvantaged group identified by prohibited grounds of discrimination.44 After setting out this test, the Chief Justice and Abella J.
immediately cautioned that:
In proposing this test, we are mindful that future cases may demand
some adjustment to the framework in order to meet the litigants’
particular circumstances. However, at this early stage in the
development of the law surrounding s. 15(2), the test we have described
provides a basic starting point — one that is adequate for determining
the issues before us on this appeal, but leaves open the possibility for
45
future refinement.

In sum, the section 15(1) jurisprudence remains confusing, unpredictable, overly burdensome and excessively formalistic, while the
section 15(2) jurisprudence remains in its infancy. Given the persistence
of significant ongoing challenges in fully developing satisfying approaches to both section 15(1) and section 15(2), we doubt that the sharp
41
Kapp, supra, note 32, at para. 23:
The analysis in a particular case, as Law itself recognizes, more usefully focusses on the
factors that identify impact amounting to discrimination. The four factors cited in Law are
based on and relate to the identification in Andrews of perpetuation of disadvantage and
stereotyping as the primary indicators of discrimination. Pre-existing disadvantage and
the nature of the interest affected (factors one and four in Law) go to perpetuation of disadvantage and prejudice, while the second factor deals with stereotyping. The
ameliorative purpose or effect of a law or program (the third factor in Law) goes to
whether the purpose is remedial within the meaning of s. 15(2). (We would suggest,
without deciding here, that the third Law factor might also be relevant to the question under s. 15(1) as to whether the effect of the law or program is to perpetuate disadvantage.)
42
The intervener LEAF has urged the Court to address the comparator group issue in its
pending ruling in Withler v. Canada (Attorney General), [2008] B.C.J. No. 2507, 2008 BCCA 539
(B.C.C.A.), appeal heard and reserved March 17, 2010, [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 68 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Withler”].
43
Kapp, supra, note 32, at para. 38.
44
Id., at para. 41.
45
Id.
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decline in the grant rate in section 15 leave applications in the past decade can be explained entirely by a “maturing jurisprudence” hypothesis.
This conclusion is fortified by taking note of the sharper decline in the
grant rate for section 15 cases compared to the decline in the grant rate in
Charter cases generally, a point to which we will now return.

VI. THE SHARPER RATE OF DECLINE IN THE GRANT
RATE FOR SECTION 15 CASES
Our five-year aggregations of Brown et al.’s annual data (depicted in
Chart 2 above) show that the grant rate in Charter cases has declined
over the past 20 years from a high of 23.8 per cent to a low of 15 per
cent, while our data on the grant rate in section 15 cases over the same
five-year periods (depicted in Chart 1 above) shows a decline from a
high of 47.1 per cent to a low of 22 per cent.46 If we aggregate and compare the data for the two decades under study (1989-1999 and 19992009), the grant rate in all Charter cases dropped from 22.9 per cent to
17.7 per cent, whereas the grant rate in section 15 cases dropped from
42.5 per cent to 23.2 per cent. It appears that the grant rate in section 15
cases has been consistently higher than the grant rate in Charter cases
generally,47 although the gap has closed substantially in recent years as
the grant rate in section 15 cases has declined more sharply.
The proportionate decline in the grant rate over these two decades for
section 15 cases was exactly twice as high as it was for Charter cases as a
whole over the same period (45.4 per cent and 22.7 per cent respec-

46
Note that the grant rate in Charter cases over this period has been consistently higher than
the grant rate in leave applications generally (on the latter, see text accompanying notes 20-23, supra). This is hardly surprising, as Charter cases are more likely to raise issues the Court considers of
“public importance”.
47
The higher grant rate in section 15 cases compared to the grant rate in Charter cases as a
whole would be consistent with the Court’s view that equality rights “reflect the fondest dreams, the
highest hopes and finest aspirations of Canadian society” (Vriend, supra, note 7) and also “the most
difficult right” (Beverley McLachlin, “Equality: The Most Difficult Right” (2001) 14 S.C.L.R. (2d)
17). Nevertheless, we caution against drawing this conclusion without further investigation. The
reason for our caution is that a comparison of the grant rate for our dataset with Brown et al.’s grant
rate may be misleading. As we described above (text accompanying notes 13-18, supra), we used
narrow criteria of inclusion in an effort to limit our dataset to “genuine” s. 15 appeals (for example,
we excluded cases raising s. 15 issues on leave applications if they had not been addressed by the
courts below). Brown et al., in their annual reports (supra, note 23), do not describe the criteria they
used to label a case a Charter case. For example, if they used more inclusive criteria, that could
account for the lower grant rate they found in all Charter cases compared to the grant rate we found
in our dataset of s. 15 cases.
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tively).48 In other words, while the odds of being granted leave in a Charter case dropped by about a quarter from 1999-2009 compared to the
previous decade, the odds of being granted leave in a section 15 case
dropped by almost half over the same period. This data provides further
support for the view that the decline in the section 15 grant rate cannot be
explained entirely by evolutions in the jurisprudence. The Court’s interest in developing Charter equality rights jurisprudence has declined
dramatically since the late 1990s for reasons that cannot be explained
entirely by a diminished need to fulfil its role in guiding the development
of the law in the area.

VII. THE MARGINALIZATION OF SECTION 15 IN RECENT
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA RULINGS
The Court’s declining interest in Charter equality rights in recent years
becomes even clearer when one considers how little attention the Court
ended up giving to equality rights issues in the section 15 cases to which it
granted leave to appeal. In this section, we will review what the Court had
to say in the section 15 cases to which it granted leave to appeal from 2004
to 2009. This was the period with the lowest leave grant rate in section 15
cases — nine of 41 — in any of the five-year periods depicted in Chart 1
above. Even then, the Court’s reasons disposing of the section 15 appeals
in five of these nine cases — B.C. Health Services,49 Baier,50 Ermineskin,51
C. (A.),52 and Hutterian Brethren53 — relegated section 15 issues to the
sidelines as other constitutional issues took centre stage. In a sixth case in
this group, Fraser v. Ontario,54 a ruling on appeal is pending. It is likely
that section 15 arguments will be given brief consideration when the Court
releases its ruling in Fraser, as they were in the reasons of the Ontario
48
We calculated the proportionate decline as follows: the grant rate in s. 15 cases declined
19.3 per cent from 42.5 per cent to 23.2 per cent; 19.3 of 42.5 amounts to a proportionate decline of
45.4 per cent. The grant rate in Charter cases declined 5.2 per cent from 22.9 per cent to 17.7 per
cent; 5.2 of 22.9 amounts to a proportionate decline of 22.7 per cent.
49
Health Services and Support – Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia,
[2007] S.C.J. No. 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “B.C. Health Services”].
50
Baier v. Alberta, [2007] S.C.J. No. 31, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 673 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Baier”].
51
Supra, note 3.
52
Supra, note 3.
53
Supra, note 3.
54
Fraser v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2008] O.J. No. 4543, 92 O.R. (3d) 481 (Ont.
C.A.) [hereinafter “Fraser”], appeal heard and reserved December 17, 2009, [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 9
(S.C.C.).
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Court of Appeal. In a seventh case, Hislop,55 the Court had little to add on
the issue of the section 15(1) violation to what had been said by the Ontario Court of Appeal.56 The real issue in Hislop was the appropriate
remedy. That leaves only two of the cases granted leave from 2004 to 2009
― Kapp57 and Withler58 ― in which the Court engaged, or in the case of
Withler, will engage, with section 15 in any depth.
The Baier case involved a challenge based on section 2(b) and section 15 of the Charter to the validity of Alberta legislation that prohibited
public school employees from running for election as school trustees. In
opinions focused on the freedom of expression issue, the Court upheld
the legislation by an 8-1 vote. Writing on behalf of five members of the
Court, Rothstein J. quickly disposed of the section 15 claim on the basis
that occupational status is not an analogous ground of discrimination.59
In his concurring opinion for three members of the Court, LeBel J.
agreed that “the appellants have not made out their claim of a breach of
equality rights in the circumstances of this case”.60
In Ermineskin, the Court held that the challenged provisions of the
Indian Act did not violate the Crown’s fiduciary obligations to the claimant Aboriginal bands by prohibiting the investment of the bands’ share of
royalties derived from oil and gas resources located on the bands’ reserves. The bands had also argued that the prohibition on investing the
money held in trust for them deprived them of significant potential returns, in violation of their rights under section 15 of the Charter. Writing
for a unanimous Court dismissing the bands’ appeal, Rothstein J. had
little difficulty rejecting the section 15 claim. While the law drew a distinction between funds held for Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal persons,
its purpose was to place greater control over decisions in the hands of the
bands. Therefore, he held, “the provisions of the Indian Act that prohibit
investment of the royalties by the Crown do not draw a distinction that
55
Canada (Attorney General) v. Hislop, [2007] S.C.J. No. 10, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 429 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Hislop”].
56
The Court affirmed the Ontario Court of Appeal’s ruling that the challenged federal legislation discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation by not conferring eligibility to Canada Pension
Plan survivor benefits on survivors whose same-sex partners died prior to January 1, 1998 and by
failing to grant retroactive relief. In his opinion for the Court, Rothstein J. briefly dismissed the
government’s arguments challenging the conclusion that the legislation violated s. 15: id., at paras.
37-42.
57
Supra, note 32.
58
Supra, note 42.
59
Baier, supra, note 50, at para. 65.
60
Id., at para. 77. Justice Fish’s dissent was based on a violation of s. 2(b). He did not consider the alleged violation of s. 15.
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perpetuates disadvantage through prejudice or stereotyping. There is no
violation of s. 15(1) of the Charter.”61
The decision in C. (A.) focused on whether the section 2(a) or section
7 rights of a 15-year-old Jehovah’s Witness were violated by a Manitoba
statute that authorized the administration of treatment without consent to
“mature minors” under the age of 16. The Court, in a 6-1 opinion, dismissed A.C.’s Charter challenge to the legislation. In the course of its
reasons, the Court commented briefly on the argument that the statute
discriminated on the basis of age. Justice Abella, writing the principal
majority opinion for four members of the Court, dismissed the section 15
claim in a few paragraphs, concluding that the legislation is based on
“maturity, not age, and no disadvantaging prejudice or stereotype based
on age can be said to be engaged”.62 In her concurring opinion, McLachlin C.J.C. likewise had little difficulty disposing of the section 15 claim.
In her view, the distinction drawn by the legislation on the basis of the
age “is ameliorative, not invidious”.63 In his dissent, Binnie J. found that
the legislation at issue violated section 2(a) and section 7 of the Charter.
In his view it was not necessary to pursue a full section 15 analysis, as
“the real gravamen of A.C.’s complaint is [not] age discrimination. Her
fundamental concern is with the forced treatment of her body in violation
of her religious convictions.”64
Like C. (A.), the Hutterian Brethren ruling also focused on a claim
based on freedom of religion, giving only cursory treatment to the argument that the claimants’ equality rights were violated by Alberta’s photo
requirement for driver’s licences. Chief Justice McLachlin, writing for a
4-3 majority, dismissed the Charter challenge to the regulation. While a
section 15 violation was assumed in the courts below, the Chief Justice
found that “it is weaker than the s. 2(a) claim and can easily be dispensed
with”.65 In her view:
Assuming the respondents could show that the regulation creates a
distinction on the enumerated ground of religion, it arises not from any
demeaning stereotype but from a neutral and rationally defensible
policy choice. There is no discrimination within the meaning of
Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, as
explained in Kapp. The Colony members’ claim is to the unfettered
61
62
63
64
65

Ermineskin, supra, note 3, at para. 202.
C. (A.), supra, note 3, at para. 111.
Id., at para. 152.
Id., at para. 231.
Hutterian Brethren, supra, note 3, at para. 105.
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practice of their religion, not to be free from religious discrimination.
The substance of the respondents’ s. 15(1) claim has already been dealt
66
with under s. 2(a). There is no breach of s. 15(1).

In separate dissents, Abella J. and LeBel J. found that the challenged
regulation violated section 2(a) and could not be justified pursuant to
section 1. Even though their analyses were founded on the burdensome
impact of the law on a vulnerable religious minority, neither dissent
made any mention of the section 15 claim.
The tendency to collapse equality rights concerns into an analysis focused on alleged violations of civil liberties evident in C. (A.) and
Hutterian Brethren is also exemplified by the Court’s earlier ruling in
B.C. Health Services.67 At issue was the constitutional validity of B.C.
legislation that interfered with the collective bargaining rights of unions
representing health care workers. The vast majority of the employees
affected by the legislation were women. The unions argued that the Act
discriminated on the basis of sex (among other grounds) and also violated their freedom of association. The Court focused its opinion on the
latter argument, finding that parts of the Act violated freedom of association protected by section 2(d) of the Charter. The violation could not be
upheld pursuant to section 1 because the government had failed to demonstrate that the Act impaired freedom of association as little as
reasonably possible in order to achieve its objective of improving health
care delivery.68 After reaching this conclusion, McLachlin C.J.C. and
LeBel J., in their joint majority opinion, disposed of the section 15 argument briskly in a single paragraph:
… we conclude that the distinctions made by the Act relate essentially
to segregating different sectors of employment, in accordance with the
long-standing practice in labour regulation of creating legislation
specific to particular segments of the labour force, and do not amount
to discrimination under section 15 of the Charter. The differential and
adverse effects of the legislation on some groups of workers relate
essentially to the type of work they do, and not to the persons they are.
Nor does the evidence disclose that the Act reflects the stereotypical
application of group or personal characteristics. Without minimizing
the importance of the distinctions made by the Act to the lives and
work of affected health care employees, the differential treatment based

66
67
68

Id., at para. 108.
Supra, note 49.
Id., at para. 156.
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on personal characteristics required to get a discrimination analysis off
69
the ground is absent here.

Like the Court’s ruling in Hutterian Brethren, this passage seems to
ignore the concept of adverse effects discrimination, supposedly a centrepiece of the Court’s commitment to a substantive conception of
equality.70 Adverse effects discrimination occurs when neutral rules have
a disproportionate impact on the basis of prohibited grounds of discrimination. There is no need to prove a discriminatory intention; the focus is
on effects. In B.C. Health Services, even though the Act had “painful”,71
dramatic and unusual effects72 on the rights of health care workers, a
group composed predominantly of women, the Court found the Act was
not discriminatory. Without further explanation from the Court regarding
the difference between B.C. Health Services and successful adverse effects discrimination claims, it is difficult to understand why the
disproportionate impact of the B.C. legislation on women was insufficient to get an adverse effects discrimination analysis “off the ground”.73
In Fraser, the Ontario Court of Appeal found that the challenged Ontario statute violated the right to collective bargain of agricultural
workers contrary to section 2(d) of the Charter. The claimants also challenged the statute as a violation of section 15. The Court of Appeal
devoted the bulk of its reasons to the section 2(d) violation. It made brief
69
Id., at para. 165. In her reasons dissenting on the s. 2(d) issue, Deschamps J. agreed with
the majority that “no claim of discrimination contrary to s. 15 of the Charter has been established”.
Id., at para. 170.
70
In Andrews, supra, note 14, at para. 37, in defining discrimination for the purposes of
s. 15, the Court adopted the definition of adverse effects discrimination put forward in Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v. Simpsons Sears Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 74, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536, at 551
(S.C.C.). The Court has reaffirmed the view that s. 15(1) prohibits adverse effects discrimination on
a number of occasions. For examples of decisions where the Court found that equality rights were
violated by the adverse effects, or disproportionate impact, of neutral rules, see Vriend, supra, note
7, at para. 82 (failure to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation has disproportionate impact on gays and lesbians); Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] S.C.J. No.
86, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Eldridge”] (failure to provide public funding for
interpretation in hospitals has disproportionate impact on the hearing impaired). The leading case in
the statutory anti-discrimination context is British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations
Commission) v. BCGSEU (Meiorin Grievance), [1999] S.C.J. No. 46, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.)
(aerobic test for firefighters has disproportionate negative impact on women).
71
Supra, note 49, at para. 166.
72
Id., at para. 160.
73
For an excellent discussion, see Judy Fudge, “Conceptualizing Collective Bargaining under the Charter: The Enduring Problem of Substantive Equality” (2008) 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 213, at
227-43 [hereinafter “Fudge”]. Fudge points out that “the impact of selecting health care workers was
disproportionately to disadvantage women workers” (at 238) and that “the Court’s analysis ignored
the extent to which labour legislation reflects and reinforces historical patterns of labour market
discrimination and segregation” (at 241).
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comments dismissing the section 15 claim, citing and following the conclusions of the Supreme Court in B.C. Health Services and Baier. In the
Court’s view, “there is no basis for finding that ‘agricultural worker’ is an
analogous ground”. Differential treatment of workers in a particular
“economic sector” does not implicate “a personal characteristic of the
type necessary to support a section 15 claim”.74 If it follows the recent
trend, the pending Supreme Court ruling on appeal in Fraser will focus
on the section 2(d) claim, with the section 15 claim relegated to a sidebar.
The failure of the Court to engage with adverse effects discrimination arguments was also evident in Charkaoui.75 The Court did briefly
discuss and dismiss a section 15 argument that the security certificate
regime in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act76 discriminates
against non-citizens by subjecting them to lengthy periods of detention.77
The Court did not consider worthy of comment arguments of adverse
effects discrimination against Arab and Muslim men raised by three
interveners.78 These interveners pointed to the prejudice and stereotyping
faced by Arab and Muslim persons in Canada post-9/11. They alleged
that racial profiling had contributed to the discriminatory application of
the IRPA contrary to section 15. They situated their arguments in Canada’s history of discriminatory immigration laws and policies that
discriminated against vulnerable and stigmatized immigrant communities
during times of heightened security.79 These issues had not been explored
in the courts below, as the constitutional challenges brought by Almrei,
Charkaoui and Harkat to the security certificate regime had focused on
section 7 of the Charter.
One can understand the reluctance of the Court in Charkaoui to
comment on the issue of adverse effects discrimination without the benefit of a full factual record and legal argument in the lower courts. The
Court’s reluctance may also be explained by the fact that the section 15
74

Fraser, supra, note 54, at para. 114.
Supra, note 17. The Charkaoui ruling is excluded from our dataset because the lower
courts did not discuss s. 15 of the Charter.
76
S.C. 2001, c. 27 [hereinafter “IRPA”].
77
Charkaoui, supra, note 17, at paras. 129-132.
78
See the facta of the Canadian Arab Federation; the Canadian Council for Refugees, African Canadian Legal Clinic, International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group, and National AntiRacism Council of Canada; and the Canadian Council on American-Islamic Relations, and Canadian
Muslim Civil Liberties Association.
79
For a full discussion of the equality arguments raised by the interveners in Charkaoui, see
Karen Morimoto, “Section 15 of the Charter and the Supreme Court of Canada’s Response in
Charkaoui” (unpublished manuscript, December 2009, on file with the authors).
75
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constitutional question it framed was limited to the question of discrimination between citizens and non-citizens. Nevertheless, the Court could
have given some much-needed life support to the concept of adverse effects discrimination in section 15 jurisprudence by at least pointing to the
reasons why it did not consider it to be established, or even worthy of
serious consideration, in this case. By failing to comment on the interveners’ arguments, the Court’s ruling in Charkaoui adds to the
impression left by B.C. Health Services that the Court now views adverse
effects discrimination arguments as being outside of section 15’s purview
altogether.
Our discussion above has described the short shrift given to section
15 arguments in five of the nine cases to which the Court granted leave
in the 2004-2009 period. This review demonstrates that the Court’s diminishing engagement with section 15 is evident not only in the
historically low grant rate in leave applications during this period; it is
also evidenced by the alarming brevity and superficiality of the Court’s
dismissal of section 15 arguments in the majority of the section 15 cases
to which it has granted leave.

VIII. WHO IS GRANTED LEAVE TO APPEAL IN SECTION 15 CASES?
In addition to tracking changes over time in the grant rate in section
15 cases, our dataset allows us to determine whether the chances of being
granted leave to appeal in section 15 cases differ depending on whether
section 15 violations are established or not established at the Court of
Appeal.
Beginning with the 1989-1990 Term, the Court has disposed of 177
applications for leave to appeal in section 15 cases (see Appendices A
and B). In 159 of these cases, the claimant failed to establish a violation
of section 15 at the Court of Appeal. The Court granted leave to appeal in
roughly one quarter of these cases (41 of 159, or 25.8 per cent). In a
much smaller group of cases, the claimant established a violation of section 15 at the Court of Appeal. When leave was sought, usually by the
government, from a finding that Charter equality rights had been violated, the Court granted leave most of the time — in 13 of 18 cases (or
72.2 per cent). In other words, the odds of being granted leave if a section 15 violation was not established at the Court of Appeal are roughly 1
in 4; the odds of being granted leave if a section 15 violation was estab-
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lished at the Court of Appeal are roughly 3 in 4. These results are depicted in Chart 3 below.

Our finding that a substantial disparity exists in section 15 grant rates
depending on whether a section 15 violation was established or not established at the Court of Appeal is unsurprising for a number of reasons.
Often section 15 claims are made without a strong legal or evidentiary
foundation. Among the 159 cases where a violation was not established
at the Court of Appeal, therefore, are a significant number of misconceived or poorly presented section 15 claims. Of course these claims fail
in the lower courts and then are denied leave to appeal. In contrast, each
of the 18 cases where a violation was established at the Court of Appeal
feature, by definition, viable section 15 claims. They are, as a result,
much more likely to be granted leave. Furthermore, a finding by a Court
of Appeal that a government law or policy has discriminated contrary to
section 15 of the Charter in a manner that cannot be upheld pursuant to
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section 1 virtually guarantees that an issue of public importance is at
stake.
Nevertheless, the size of the disparity is striking — when a section
15 claim is established at the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court of
Canada is almost three times as likely to grant leave to appeal compared
to when a section 15 violation is not established at the Court of Appeal.
The odds of being granted leave in section 15 cases lean heavily in favour of governments.
While the pressures on the Court’s docket mean that it cannot grant
leave to every case raising issues of public importance, the frequency
with which the Court fails to hear appeals of strongly argued section 15
claims that were rejected at the Court of Appeal is difficult to square with
the view that equality rights “reflect the fondest dreams, the highest
hopes and finest aspirations of Canadian society”.80 Those dreams, hopes
and aspirations are frequently dashed in the leave process, particularly in
recent years as the leave rate in section 15 cases has plummeted. Let us
offer a few examples.
The Court has dismissed applications for leave to appeal in a series
of cases, most recently in Boulter v. Nova Scotia,81 raising the issue of
whether poverty or receipt of social assistance is an analogous ground of
discrimination.82 As a result, a quarter-century after section 15 came into
force, litigants still have no authoritative ruling from the top court on
whether the poor can benefit from Charter equality rights.
In addition to the issue of discrimination on the basis of poverty, the
Boulter case involved a claim that Nova Scotia legislation precluding the
adjustment of power rates for low income consumers amounted to adverse effects discrimination on the basis of race, sex, disability and
marital status, among other grounds. Five low-income claimants provided evidence, supported by nine experts and a public interest
intervener. The claimants’ “impressive presentation”, as Fichaud J.A.
described it at the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal,83 included demographic
80

Vriend, supra, note 7.
Boulter v. Nova Scotia Power Inc., [2009] N.S.J. No. 64, 2009 NSCA 17 (N.S.C.A.)
[hereinafter “Boulter”]. See also Masse v. Ontario (Ministry of Community and Social Services),
[1996] O.J. No. 363, 134 D.L.R. (4th) 20 (Ont. Gen. Div.), leave to appeal refused, [1996] O.J. No.
1526 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Masse”]; R. v. Banks, [2007] O.J. No. 99, 275 D.L.R. (4th) 640 (Ont.
C.A.) [hereinafter “Banks”].
82
Had the appeal not been abandoned after leave was granted, the Court would have had an
opportunity to address the issue of discrimination on the basis of receipt of social assistance in
Falkiner v. Ontario, [2002] O.J. No. 1771, 212 D.L.R. (4th) 633 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Falkiner”].
83
Boulter, supra, note 81, at para. 84.
81
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evidence of the over-representation among the poor of disabled persons,
women, single mothers, racial minorities, recent immigrants, children
and the elderly.84 When a claim is this well assembled and raises profound constitutional issues that the Court has yet to address (whether
poverty is an analogous ground, whether the disparate impact of such a
law amounts to adverse effects discrimination), issues that have long
been the subject of academic debate85 and conflicting lower court rulings,86 the denial of leave to appeal is disconcerting to say the least.
As we described above, the Court’s ruling in Kapp reformulated the
tests for section 15(1) and section 15(2). At the same time, the Court signalled the need for further adjustments to the section 15(1) test to relieve
claimants of its overly burdensome and formalistic aspects. Likewise, it
invited future refinements to the new section 15(2) test it offered as a
“basic starting point”. Despite the Court’s recognition of the need for
further guidance and development of the section 15 jurisprudence, it has
granted leave to appeal in only three of 20 section 15 leave applications
since the release of Kapp.87 A number of the cases denied leave would
have offered excellent opportunities to provide further clarification and
development of the shift in direction signalled by Kapp.
For example, in Downey,88 the first section 15 ruling issued by an
appellate court following Kapp, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal upheld
Nova Scotia workers’ compensation regulations capping benefits for
chronic pain at a low level. The Downey case was a sequel to the
84

Id., at para. 48.
Martha Jackman, “The Protection of Welfare Rights Under the Charter” (1988) 20 Ottawa L. Rev. 257; Martha Jackman, “Poor Rights: Using the Charter to Support Social Welfare
Claims” (1993) 19 Queen’s L.J. 65; Martha Jackman, “Constitutional Contact with the Disparities in
the World: Poverty as a Prohibited Ground of Discrimination Under the Canadian Charter and Human Rights Law” (1994) 2 Rev. Const. Studies 76; Margot Young, ed., Poverty: Rights, Social
Citizenship and Legal Activism (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007).
86
Examples of cases supporting the view that receipt of social assistance or poverty is an
analogous ground include: Falkiner, supra, note 82; Schaff v. Canada, [1993] T.C.J. No. 389, [1993]
2 C.T.C. 2695 (C.T.C.); R. v. Rehberg, [1993] N.S.J. No. 35, 111 D.L.R. (4th) 336 (N.S.S.C.); Dartmouth Halifax (County) Regional Housing v. Sparks, [1993] N.S.J. No. 97, 101 D.L.R. (4th) 224
(N.S.S.C.). Examples of cases supporting the view that receipt of social assistance or poverty is not
an analogous ground include: Boulter, supra, note 81; Masse, supra, note 81; Banks, supra, note 81;
Federated Anti-Poverty Groups of B.C. v. Vancouver, [2002] B.C.J. No. 493, 2002 BCSC 105
(B.C.S.C.); Polewsky v. Home Hardware Stores Ltd., [2003] O.J. No. 2908, 66 O.R. (3d) 600 (Ont.
S.C.J.); Ross v. Charlottetown (City), [2008] P.E.I.J. No. 23, 2008 PESCAD 6 (P.E.I.S.C.); Toussaint v. Canada, [2009] F.C.J. No. 1034, 2009 FC 873 (F.C.A.).
87
See Appendix B. The three s. 15 cases granted leave since the release of the ruling in
Kapp are Fraser, supra, note 54; Withler, supra, note 42; and Cunningham v. Alberta (Aboriginal
Affairs and Northern Development), [2009] A.J. No. 133, 2009 ABCA 53 (Alta. C.A.).
88
Downey v. Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Appeals Tribunal), [2008] N.S.J. No.
314, 2008 NSCA 65 (N.S.C.A.) [hereinafter “Downey”].
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Supreme Court’s ruling in Martin,89 in which the Court held, reversing an
opinion written by Cromwell J.A. at the Court of Appeal,90 that the complete denial of benefits for chronic pain under Nova Scotia’s workers’
compensation scheme constituted discrimination on the basis of physical
disability contrary to section 15. The Nova Scotia government responded
by providing benefits for chronic pain ranging from 3 per cent to a
maximum of 6 per cent (of 75 per cent of pre-accident gross weekly
earnings).
In Downey, Cromwell J. wrote the opinion for the unanimous Court
of Appeal, upholding the six per cent cap for reasons similar to those he
gave in Martin for upholding the denial of any benefits to injured workers for chronic pain. Justice Cromwell’s reasons in Downey applied the
Law test as if it was “business as usual” after Kapp. After considering the
appropriate comparator group, and the four contextual factors, he concluded that the 6 per cent cap on benefits did not demean the dignity of
workers suffering from chronic pain.91 He gave no apparent weight to the
Supreme Court’s dicta in Kapp that human dignity should not be treated
as a legal test, nor to the Court’s suggestion that section 15(1) claimants
need to be relieved of the excessive burdens and formalism that have
characterized section 15(1) jurisprudence. Despite the fact that granting
leave in Downey would have given the Court an opportunity to clarify
these issues, the Supreme Court denied leave to appeal.
In Harris,92 another post-Kapp section 15 case denied leave by the
Supreme Court, the Federal Court of Appeal divided over whether the
challenged provisions of the Canada Pension Plan discriminated on the
basis of disability. To qualify for a disability pension, workers must have
made mandatory contributions to the Plan in four of the last six years
prior to the date of their application. In order to help parents meet these
requirements, a “child-rearing drop out” (“CRDO”) provision allows the
years that a contributor stayed home to care for his or her children before
they reach the age of seven to be dropped out of the contribution history.
The assumption of the provision is that parents have a greater ability to
return to the workforce once their children are in full-time school. The
89
Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin; Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Laseur, [2003] S.C.J. No. 54, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504 (S.C.C.).
90
Martin v. Workers’ Compensation Board (Nova Scotia), [2000] N.S.J. No. 353, 192
D.L.R. (4th) 611 (N.S.C.A.), revd [2003] S.C.J. No. 54, 231 D.L.R. (4th) 385 (S.C.C.).
91
Downey, supra, note 88, at para. 82.
92
Harris v. Canada (Minister of Human Resources and Skills Development), [2009] F.C.J.
No. 70, [2009] 4 F.C.R. 330 (F.C.A.) [hereinafter “Harris”].
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claimant had to stay home to care for her disabled child beyond the age
of seven and was unable to meet the requirements for a disability pension
as a result.
The majority of the Court of Appeal found that the CRDO provision
did not violate section 15. One member of the majority, Ryer J.A., found
that the claimant was not denied a benefit provided by the law.93 The
other member of the majority, Evans J.A., found that the law was aimed
at the legitimate purpose of extending benefits to “parents who temporarily leave employment to look after young children”;94 it did not amount
to differential treatment on the basis of disability.95 In his dissent, Linden
J.A. was alone in recognizing that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Kapp
“calls for a recommitment to the ideal of substantive equality”.96 In his
view, the law was based on the stereotypical view “that children seven
years of age and older are capable of attending school full-time”, a view
that does not reflect “the different circumstances of disabled children
who are not able to attend school full-time and continue to require ongoing full-time home care”.97
Granting leave to appeal in Harris would have given the Supreme
Court an opportunity to address the three different approaches to the section 15 issue articulated at the Court of Appeal. In particular, the Court
could have explored the issue of whether the law imposed disadvantage
through the operation of stereotype, the nub of the disagreement between
Evans and Linden JJ.A., and a question at the heart of the section 15(1)
test as reformulated in Kapp. In addition, the Court could have addressed
whether the CRDO provision constitutes a program with an ameliorative
purpose targeted at a disadvantaged group defined by prohibited grounds
of discrimination, in accordance with the Court’s approach to section
15(2) set out in Kapp. The Court’s decision to deny leave in Harris unfortunately deprives us of answers to these questions.
In sum, even though it has acknowledged that the section 15(1) jurisprudence remains confusing, unpredictable, overly burdensome and
excessively formalistic, and that the section 15(2) jurisprudence remains
in its infancy, and even though it has been presented with a number of
compelling section 15 leave applications, the Supreme Court persists in
its recent tendency to deny leave in section 15 cases at historically high
93
94
95
96
97

Id., at para. 106.
Id., at para. 81 (emphasis in original).
Id., at para. 92.
Id., at para. 27.
Id., at para. 57.
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rates, particularly if a section 15 violation has not been established at the
Court of Appeal.

IX. RESULTS OF APPEALS TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
CANADA IN SECTION 15 CASES
When the Supreme Court of Canada does grant leave in section 15
cases, what does our dataset tell us about the results on appeal? Is the
likelihood of the Court allowing the appeal different depending on
whether the section 15 claim was established at the Court of Appeal?
We found that when a section 15 claim was established at the Court
of Appeal, the Supreme Court has allowed the appeal and dismissed the
section 15 challenge in 6 of 11 cases, or 54.5 per cent of appeals. When
the section 15 claim was not established at the Court of Appeal, the Court
has allowed the appeal and found an unjustifiable violation of section 15
in 6 of 38 cases, or 15.8 per cent of appeals. In other words, when the
Supreme Court hears an appeal by a party, usually the government, from
a Court of Appeal ruling that upheld a section 15 claim, the appellant has
a better than even chance of prevailing at the Supreme Court on the section 15 issue. In contrast, when a claimant appeals from a Court of
Appeal ruling dismissing a section 15 claim, the appellant has a less than
1 in 6 chance of prevailing at the Supreme Court on the section 15 issue.
These results are depicted in Chart 4 below.
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Our data reveal that just as governments have much better odds of
being granted leave by the Supreme Court of Canada in section 15 cases
(Chart 3), the odds of succeeding on appeal in section 15 cases likewise
lean heavily in favour of governments (Chart 4).

X. CONCLUSION
While equality rights have received little attention in the Court’s recent case law (with the exception of Kapp), equality concerns have not
been absent. For example, in B.C. Health Services, the Court placed emphasis on the Charter value of equality to support its recognition of a
right to collective bargain as an element of freedom of association protected by section 2(d) of the Charter.98 As the Chief Justice and LeBel J.
wrote, “[o]ne of the fundamental achievements of collective bargaining
is to palliate the historical inequality between employers and employees.”99 Yet, as we described above, the Court tersely dismissed the claim
based on equality rights in a manner that, as Judy Fudge has pointed out,
98
99

Supra, note 49, at paras. 81, 84 and 86.
Id., at para. 84.
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“both reflects and promotes an idea of equality directed at fighting
stereotypes to the exclusion of fostering substantive equality”.100
While the Court regularly affirms its commitment to interpreting section 15 as embodying a commitment to substantive equality, it usually
does so for the purpose of dismissing section 15 claims and narrowing
the scope of equality rights. One lesson embodied in substantive equality
is that differential treatment based on prohibited grounds is not necessarily discriminatory. Another is that treating people the same when they are
differently situated can have discriminatory effects on the basis of prohibited grounds. The first lesson is a staple of the jurisprudence, leading
regularly to the dismissal of section 15 claims. The second lesson is often
ignored, leading regularly to the dismissal of claims based on adverse
effects discrimination. As a result, rather than signalling the commencement of a rich contextual inquiry into historical disadvantage and the
possible impact of a challenged law in sustaining relations of social subordination, the ritual incantation of a commitment to substantive equality
has become, perversely, the death knell of Charter equality rights claims.
As we discussed above, the Court’s ruling last year in Hutterian
Brethren,101 dismissing a Charter challenge to the addition of a photo
requirement to Alberta driver’s licence regulations, is typical of the
Court’s tendency to focus on other Charter rights and freedoms and their
reasonable limits to the exclusion of any serious consideration of equality
rights. The majority opinion of McLachlin C.J.C. dismissed the claim
based on section 15 on the grounds that any negative impact of the law
on the Hutterian Brethren “arises not from any demeaning stereotype but
from a neutral and rationally defensible policy choice”.102 The dissenters,
like the majority, focused exclusively on the unjustifiable violation of
freedom of religion. Justice Abella’s dissent emphasized the risks the
photo requirement posed to the autonomy and self-sufficiency of the religious community.103 She pointed out that the majority’s opinion was
inconsistent with the principle that once the state has provided a benefit
(such as licensing operators of motor vehicles), it must do so in a nondiscriminatory manner.104 In his dissent, LeBel J. noted that a driver’s
licence “is often of critical importance in daily life and is certainly so in

100
101
102
103
104

Fudge, supra, note 73, at 216.
Supra, note 3.
Id., at para. 108.
Id., at paras. 114, 164-170.
Id., at para. 171, citing Eldridge, supra, note 70.
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rural Alberta”.105 “A small group of people”, he remarked, “is being
made to carry a heavy burden.”106
As Nathalie Des Rosiers points out in this volume, religious discrimination, including discrimination against the Hutterites, is “a-well
known fact of our history”.107 In Hutterian Brethren, the Court was confronted with a law that has a disproportionately burdensome impact on a
vulnerable religious minority whose way of life has been targeted by the
provincial government in the past. Is this not a scenario that ought to be
addressed by the prohibition on religious discrimination in section 15 of
the Charter? How has the jurisprudence come to a point where section 15
has been essentially taken out of the discussion even though a government policy has subordinating effects based on a prohibited ground of
discrimination?
It is true, as Des Rosiers writes, that freedom of religion can do much
of the work necessary to prevent state subordination of religious groups:
“in Canada, freedom of religion has always had strong anti-discrimination
and equality undertones”.108 Peter Hogg has noted that the Court has
tended to interpret equality rights restrictively, while giving substantial
weight to equality values in the interpretation of the scope and limits of
other Charter rights and freedoms.109 This phenomenon continues with
recent rulings such as BC Health Services and Hutterian Brethren —
equality concerns are displaced to, and subsumed within, a discussion of
105

Hutterian Brethren, id., at para. 201.
Id.
107
Nathalie Des Rosiers, “Freedom of Religion at the Supreme Court in 2009: Multiculturalism
at the Crossroads?”, in this volume, at 76. See William Janzen, Limits on Liberty: The Experience of
Mennonite, Hutterite and Doukhobor Communities in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1990). The Hutterian Brethren ruling is not the first time that the Court has been insensitive to the potential for majoritarian hostility to the Hutterites’ religious beliefs and practices. The Hutterites live in
rural colonies where the land is held in common in accordance with their religious beliefs. In Walter v.
Alberta (Attorney General), [1969] S.C.J. No. 4, [1969] S.C.R. 383 (S.C.C.), the Court managed to
ignore the history of anti-Hutterite animus that motivated the enactment of the Communal Property Act
of 1947 (and its predecessors) and the lack of any plausible legislative purpose, related to “property and
civil rights”, to ground the Act in provincial jurisdiction. For background on the Act, see Douglas E.
Sanders, “The Hutterites: A Case Study in Minority Rights” (1964) 42 Can. Bar Rev. 225. The Act was
repealed in 1972, a few years after the Walter ruling.
108
Des Rosiers, id., at 75. On the relationship between equality and religious freedom, see
also Bruce Ryder, “The Canadian Conception of Equal Religious Citizenship” in Richard Moon, ed.,
Law and Religious Pluralism in Canada (UBC Press: Vancouver, 2008) 87.
109
Peter W. Hogg, “Equality as a Charter Value in Constitutional Interpretation” (2003) 20
S.C.L.R. (2d) 113, at 117: “[T]he Charter value of equality,” he wrote, “is being imported into the
definition of other Charter rights or into the section 1 analysis. In this way, what are really equality
claims can be remedied under other rights without the need to bother with listed and analogous
grounds or human dignity, the two severe restrictions on the application of s. 15.” (footnotes omitted)
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civil liberties. Hogg speculated that there might be a connection, however
elusive and difficult to understand, between the Court’s warm embrace of
equality values and its cool distance from equality rights.110 He concluded
with a cautious endorsement of the Court’s approach, suggesting that it
might make sense because it allows for heightened scrutiny of violations of
the civil liberties of vulnerable or disadvantaged groups, while limiting
section 15 to a restricted role of remedying “classifications that are based
on listed or analogous grounds and impair human dignity”.111
We are less comfortable than Professor Hogg with the tendency of
the Court to shift equality concerns from section 15 to other Charter
rights and freedoms. Of course, a basic constitutional value like equality
should assist in the interpretation of all Charter provisions. Indeed, such
an approach is mandated by Canada’s international commitments to protecting all fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimination.112
But a provision requiring non-discrimination in the enjoyment of other
rights and freedoms should not be confused with a free-standing prohibition on discrimination. Section 15 should provide, through a large and
liberal interpretation, an independent guarantee of equality rights that
overlaps with and extends beyond protection provided by other Charter
rights and freedoms.
In a case like Hutterian Brethren, by essentially ignoring religious
equality rights, and focusing on religious freedom alone, we blinker our
legal vision. The Charter protects from state interference with the practice of religion (section 2(a)) and from state discrimination on the basis
of religion (section 15). The two provisions are closely related, but one
does not exhaust the other. A meaningful, independent role ought to be
accorded to each. What is lost when equality rights are submerged? Do
equality rights not provide a way of viewing social and legal context that
adds to the lens provided by civil liberties?

110

Id., at 133.
Id., at 134.
112
See Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, Can. T.S. 1976 No. 47 (“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect
and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized
in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”); Article 2(2) of
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, Can. T.S.
1976 No. 46 (“The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights
enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status.”).
111
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Equality rights jurisprudence recognizes a restricted number of personal characteristics as prohibited grounds of discrimination. The
recognized grounds are ones that have been deployed persistently and
pervasively as tools of power. As Reva Siegel has written:
… antidiscrimination law regulates the social practices that sustain
group inequality. The group inequalities that concern antidiscrimination
law are typically those that are socially pervasive (articulated across
social domains) and socially persistent (articulated over time). When
inequality among groups is structurally pervasive and persistent in this
way, we typically refer to it as a condition of social stratification.113

Equality rights are meant to focus our attention on removing laws or
practices whose effects perpetuate relations of social subordination based
on the personal characteristics of historically disadvantaged groups. Are
we confident that dynamics of this kind were absent from the Alberta
government’s treatment of the Wilson Colony or from the B.C. government’s treatment of predominantly female health care workers?114 How
can we be confident of the answers to these questions when they were
passed over so superficially in the Court’s rulings in Hutterian Brethren
and B.C. Health Services?
Returning to the Chief Justice’s brief reasons dismissing the section
15 claim in Hutterian Brethren,115 can we say that when laws pursue “rationally defensible policy choices” they should be immunized from
scrutiny for discriminatory effects violating section 15? Can we say a law
is “neutral” if it has adverse effects on the basis of a prohibited ground of
discrimination? The jurisprudence on disability discrimination emphatically provides negative answers to these questions. For example, in
Eaton v. Brant County Board of Education,116 Sopinka J. in his majority
opinion eloquently described the “‘mainstream’ attributes” that can “act
as headwinds to the enjoyment of society’s benefits” for the disabled.117
In his words:
… it is the failure to make reasonable accommodation, to fine-tune
society so that its structures and assumptions do not result in the
relegation and banishment of disabled persons from participation,
113
Reva Siegel, “Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How ‘Color Blindness’ Discourse
Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification” (2000) 88 Calif. L. Rev. 77, at 82.
114
Women constituted 85 per cent and 90 per cent of the membership of the two unions affected by the legislation at issue in B.C. Health Services. See Fudge, supra, note 73, at 236, note 91.
115
See text accompanying note 66, supra.
116
[1997] S.C.J. No. 98, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 241 (S.C.C.).
117
Id., at para. 67.
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which results in discrimination against them. The discrimination
inquiry which uses the “attribution of stereotypical characteristics”
reasoning as commonly understood is simply inappropriate here. It may
be seen rather as a case of reverse stereotyping which, by not allowing
for the condition of a disabled individual, ignored his or her disability
and forces the individual to sink or swim within the mainstream
environment. It is recognition of the actual characteristics, and the
reasonable accommodation of these characteristics which is the central
118
purpose of section 15(1) in relation to disability.

The type of “reverse stereotyping” to which Sopinka J. refers — the
failure to consider the distinct needs and circumstances of politically
vulnerable and socially subordinated groups — is particularly relevant to
people with disabilities. But it is not a phenomenon restricted to the dynamics of disability discrimination. Reverse stereotyping may undergird
incidences of discrimination involving any of the enumerated and analogous grounds of discrimination recognized by section 15. The grounds
are recognized precisely because they have been persistently and pervasively deployed by the law — or ignored by the law — in ways that
promote relations of social subordination.119 A full Charter analysis must
interrogate, from an equality rights perspective, the possibility that such
dynamics continue to operate.
As the analysis we have presented makes clear, to say that Charter
equality rights are not in judicial vogue is an understatement. Will the
Supreme Court of Canada continue to preside over the twilight of Charter equality rights or will it invigorate the dreams, hopes and aspirations
they embody? The mystery and silence that surrounds the leave to appeal
process make this question difficult to answer. We are left to speculate on
the reasons for the sharp decline in the Court’s interest in Charter equality rights. Perhaps the Court is of the view that the dreams, hopes and
aspirations expressed by section 15 have been accomplished. Perhaps the
Court’s recent record on equality rights is a reflection of broader political
and cultural shifts which are unsupportive of a continuing strong role for
anti-discrimination law, exemplified by the cancellation of the Court
Challenges Program and of other funding for equality-seeking groups.
Perhaps the main sources of systemic inequalities lie beyond the Char-

118
Id. See also the discussion of adverse effects discrimination in Eldridge, supra, note 70,
at paras. 60-80.
119
See Dianne Pothier, “Connecting Grounds of Discrimination to Real People’s Real Experiences” (2001) 13 C.J.W.L. 37.
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ter’s reach.120 Perhaps the Court’s commitment to substantive equality
will always be circumscribed by liberal legalism121 and an unwillingness
to utilize section 15 to redistribute material resources.122 Whatever the
explanations are for the increasing circumscription of Charter equality
rights, wise potential claimants know that they need to be cautious before
placing hopes in costly and burdensome section 15 litigation. Our analysis suggests that Charter equality rights may be reinvigorated, from a
moribund to at least a modest role, particularly if the Court is willing to
recognize new analogous grounds, to take seriously claims based on adverse effects discrimination, and to implement other shifts in the
jurisprudence that relieve claimants of the onerous burdens they now
face in proving that differential treatment on prohibited grounds amounts
to discrimination.

120
See Andrew Petter, The Politics of the Charter: The Illusive Promise of Constitutional
Rights (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010).
121
See Joel Bakan, Just Words: Constitutional Rights and Social Wrongs (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), chapter 3, “Equality and the Liberal Form of Rights”.
122
See Judy Fudge, “The Canadian Charter of Rights: Recognition, Redistribution and the
Imperialism of the Courts”, in T. Campbell, K.D. Ewing & A. Tomkin, eds., Sceptical Essays on
Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 335.
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Appendix A: Annual Disposition of
Leave to Appeal Applications in
Section 15 Cases
Term

Number of Section 15
Leave Applications

Number
Granted

1989-1990
1990-1991
1991-1992
1992-1993
1993-1994
1994-1995
1995-1996
1996-1997
1997-1998
1998-1999
1999-2000
2000-2001
2001-2002
2002-2003

8
9
10
7
5
2
5
12
11
4
12
11
9
15

1
3
4
4
3
1
2
8
3
2
3
2
2
6

12.5 %
33.3 %
40.0 %
57.1 %
60.0 %
50.0 %
40.0 %
66.7 %
27.3 %
50.0%
25.0 %
18.2 %
22.2 %
40.0 %

2003-2004
2004-2005
2005-2006
2006-2007
2007-2008
2008-2009

7
6
7
5
13
10

0
2
1
2
2
2

0.0 %
33.3 %
14.3 %
40.0 %
15.4 %
20.0 %

2009-2010123
Total

9
177

1
54

11.1 %
30.5 %

123

Up to July 31, 2010.

Percentage
Granted
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Appendix B: Disposition of Leave to
Appeal Applications in
Section 15 Cases Since 1989
We characterize section 15 claims to be “established” at the Court of Appeal if the court found a violation of section 15 that was not
demonstrably justified as a reasonable limit pursuant to section 1. We
characterize section 15 claims as “not established” at the Court of Appeal
if the court did not find a violation of section 15 or if the court found a
violation of section 15 that was demonstrably justified as a reasonable
limit pursuant to section 1. The final column in the chart below for “result of appeal” refers to the result on the section 15 claim alone.
Case Name

SCC
Case
Number

Section
15 Claim
Est’d at
CA?

Result of
Leave
Application

Result of
Appeal to
SCC on
Section 15
Claim

20809
21392
21498

No

Dismissed

3. Mun. Contr. Ltd. v. IUOE
Local 721

21531

No

4. NAPO v. Canada

21585

No

5. Skalbania v. Wedge. Vill. Est.
Ltd.

21547

No

6. Brochner v. MacDonald

21609

No

7. Prior v. Canada

21709

No

8. Richman v. Wheaton

21722

No

Granted, 19
Oct. 1989
Dismissed,
9 Nov.
1989
Dismissed,
16 Nov.
1989
Dismissed,
23 Nov.
1989
Dismissed,
30 Nov.
1989
Dismissed,
7 Dec.
1989
Dismissed,
22 Feb.
1990
Dismissed,
29 Mar.
1990

1989-1990 Term (1 of 8 granted)
1. R. v. Hess; R. v. Nguyen
2. R. v. Paul Magder Furs Ltd

No

-

-

-

-

-

-

-
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Case Name

SCC
Case
Number

541

Section
15 Claim
Est’d at
CA?

Result of
Leave
Application

Result of
Appeal to
SCC on
Section 15
Claim

Granted, 8
Nov. 1990
Dismissed,
8 Nov.
1990
Granted, 15
Nov. 1990
Dismissed,
17 Jan.
1991
Dismissed,
31 Jan.
1991
Granted, 7
Feb. 1991
Dismissed,
14 Mar.
1991
Dismissed,
18 Apr.
1991
Dismissed,
29 Aug.
1991

Dismissed

Dismissed,
7 Nov.
1991
Granted, 6
Feb. 1992
Dismissed,
6 Feb. 1992
Granted, 6
Feb. 1992
Dismissed,
5 Mar.
1992
Granted, 26
Mar. 1992

-

1990-1991 Term (3 of 9 granted)
9. Canada v. Chiarelli

21920

No

10. R. c. Lortie

21950

No

11. Schachter v. Canada

21889

Yes

12. Canada v. Central Cartage
Co.

22057

No

13. R. v. Baig

22167

No

14. R. v. Généreux

22103

No

15. Alc. Found’n of Man. v.
Winnipeg

22005

Yes

16. R. c. Genest

22118

No

17. Wittman v. Emmott

22340

No

1991-1992 Term (4 of 10 granted)
18. R. v. Sawchuk

22572

No

19. Murphy v. Welsh

22542

No

20. Auger v. Alberta

22557

No

21. Weatherall v. Canada

22633

No

22. Janitzki v. Canada

22779

No

23. Symes v. Canada

22659

No

-

Dismissed
-

-

Dismissed
-

-

-

-124
Dismissed
-

Dismissed

124
After leave was granted in Murphy v. Welsh, the claimant did not pursue the s. 15 violation issue. See [1991] S.C.C.A. No. 283.
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Case Name

SCC
Case
Number

Section
15 Claim
Est’d at
CA?

Result of
Leave
Application

Dismissed,
9 Apr.
1992
Dismissed,
7 May
1992
Granted, 4
Jun. 1992
Dismissed,
26 Jun.
1992

24. Fenton v. B.C.

22612

No

25. Mohr v. Scoffield

22784

No

26. Miron v. Trudel

22744

No

27. Cdn Assn of Reg’d Imp. v.
Canada

22871

No

1992-1993 Term (4 of 7 granted)
28. Jones v. Ont; Rheaume v.
Ontario

22935

No

29. Haig v. Canada

23223

No

30. R. v. Finta

23097

(2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d)

No

31. Penner v. Danbrook

23122

No

32. NWAC v. Canada

23253

No

33. Rodriguez v. British Columbia
34. Fernandes v. Manitoba

23476

No

23169

No

1993-1994 Term (3 of 5 granted)
35. Nguyen v. Canada

23474

No

36. Egan v. Canada

23636

No

37. Benner v. Canada

23811

No

38. Thibaudeau v. Canada

24154

Yes

39. McCarten v. Prince Edward
Island

24098

No

Result of
Appeal to
SCC on
Section 15
Claim
-

-

Allowed
-

Dismissed,
24 Sep.
1992
Granted, 22
Oct. 1992
Granted, 10
Dec. 1992
Dismissed,
21 Jan.
1993
Granted, 11
Mar. 1993
Granted, 23
Mar. 1993
Dismissed,
15 Apr.
1993

-

Dismissed,
14 Oct.
1993
Granted, 14
Oct. 1993
Granted, 10
Mar. 1994
Granted, 23
Jun. 1994
Dismissed,
25 Aug.
1994

-

Dismissed
Dismissed
-

Dismissed
Dismissed
-

Dismissed
Allowed
Allowed
-

(2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d) MANAGING CHARTER EQUALITY RIGHTS

Case Name

SCC
Case
Number

543

Section
15 Claim
Est’d at
CA?

Result of
Leave
Application

Result of
Appeal to
SCC on
Section 15
Claim

Granted, 2
Feb. 1995
Dismissed,
1 Jun. 1995

Dismissed

Dismissed,
21 Sep.
1995
Granted, 26
Oct. 1995
Dismissed,
15 Feb.
1996
Granted, 9
May 1996
Dismissed,
15 Aug.
1996

-

Granted, 3
Oct. 1996
Dismissed,
24 Oct.
1996
Granted, 5
Dec. 1996
Dismissed,
5 Dec.
1996
Granted, 6
Mar. 1997
Dismissed,
6 Mar.
1997
Granted, 24
Apr. 1997
Granted, 27
Apr. 1997
Granted, 8
May 1997

Allowed

1994-1995 Term (1 of 2 granted)
40. Adler v. Ontario

24347

No

41. Schachtschneider v. Canada

23698

No

1995-1996 Term (2 of 5 granted)
42. Lewis v. Burnaby School
Dist. #41

24514

No

43. Eaton v. Brant Co. Bd. of
Educ’n
44. Grant v. Canada

24668

Yes

24890

No

45. Eldridge v. British Columbia

24896

No

46. Netupsky v. Canada

25223

No

1996-1997 Term (8 of 12 granted)
47. Vriend v. Alberta

25285

No

48. Huynh v. Canada

25379

No

49. Law v. Canada

25374

No

50. Masse v. Ontario

25462

No

51. Vancouver SIVMW v.
Canada
52. R. v. S. (M.)

25359

No

25742

No

53. M. v. H.

25838

Yes

54. Corbiere v. Canada

25708

Yes

55. Orlowski v. British
Columbia

25751

No

-

Allowed
-

Allowed
-

-

Dismissed
-

Dismissed
-

Dismissed
Dismissed
Dismissed
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Case Name

SCC
Case
Number

Section
15 Claim
Est’d at
CA?

Result of
Leave
Application

Granted, 8
May 1997
Granted, 8
May 1997
Dismissed,
19 Jun.
1997

56. Bese v. British Columbia

25855

No

57. Winko v. British Columbia

25856

No

58. Bahlsen v. Canada

25783

No

1997-1998 Term (3 of 11 granted)
59. Delisle v. Canada

25926

No

60. Gale Estate v. Hominick

26002

No

61. Perry v. Ontario

26167

No

62. Schafer v. Canada

26246

Yes

63. Bal v. Ontario

26116

No

64. Lovelace v. Ontario

26165

No

65. R. v. LePage

26320

No

66. A & L Investments Ltd. v.
Ontario

26395

(2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d)

No

67. East York v. Ontario

26385

No

68. Canada v. Wong

26465

No

69. Villeneuve c. Quebec

26499

No

1998-1999 Term (2 of 4 granted)
70. Granovsky v. Canada

26615

No

71. Gallant v. New Brunswick

26785

No

Result of
Appeal to
SCC on
Section 15
Claim
Dismissed
Dismissed
-

Granted, 16
Oct. 1997
Dismissed,
16 Oct.
1997
Dismissed,
18 Dec.
1997
Dismissed,
29 Jan.
1998
Dismissed,
12 Feb.
1998
Granted, 12
Feb. 1998
Granted, 19
Feb. 1998
Dismissed,
19 Mar.
1998
Dismissed,
2 Apr.
1998
Dismissed,
11 Jun.
1998
Dismissed,
11 Jun.
1998

Dismissed

Granted, 8
Oct. 1998
Dismissed,
17 Dec.
1998

Dismissed

Dismissed
Dismissed
-

-

(2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d) MANAGING CHARTER EQUALITY RIGHTS

Case Name

SCC
Case
Number

Section
15 Claim
Est’d at
CA?

Result of
Leave
Application

Dismissed,
28 Jan.
1999
Granted, 18
Feb. 1999

72. Sutherland v. Canada

26056

No

73. Little Sisters v. Canada

26858

Yes

1999-2000 Term (3 of 12 granted)
74. Ont. Pub. School Bds’ Assn.
v. Ont.

27490

Yes

75. Ferrell v. Ontario

27127

No

76. Moxham v. Canada

27180

No

77. Guillemette v. Canada

27280

No

78. R. v. Nelson

27594

No

79. Dunmore v. Ontario

27216

No

80. Franks v. B.C.

27414

No

81. Jazairi v. Ontario

27500

No

82. Lavoie v. Canada

27427

No

83. Gosselin v. Quebec

27418

No

84. Pawar v. Canada

27578

No

85. Cameron v. Nova Scotia

27584

No

2000-2001 Term (2 of 11 granted)
86. Cannella v. TTC

27705

No

545

Result of
Appeal to
SCC on
Section 15
Claim
-

Dismissed

Dismissed,
4 Nov.
1999
Dismissed,
9 Dec.
1999
Dismissed,
9 Dec.
1999
Dismissed,
16 Dec.
1999
Dismissed,
17 Feb.
2000
Granted, 24
Feb. 2000
Dismissed,
2 Mar.
2000
Dismissed,
3 May
2000
Granted, 25
May 2000
Granted, 1
Jun. 2000
Dismissed,
8 Jun. 2000
Dismissed,
29 Jun.
2000

-

Dismissed,
14 Sep.
2000

-

-

-

-

-

Dismissed
-

-

Dismissed
Dismissed
-
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Case Name

SCC
Case
Number

Section
15 Claim
Est’d at
CA?

Result of
Leave
Application

Dismissed,
12 Oct.
2000
Dismissed,
9 Nov.
2000
Granted, 15
Feb. 2001
Dismissed,
15 Mar.
2001
Dismissed,
22 Mar.
2001
Dismissed,
3 May
2001
Granted, 14
Jun. 2001
Dismissed,
21 Jun.
2001
Dismissed,
30 Aug.
2001
Dismissed,
30 Aug.
2001

87. Pérusse v. Canada

27835

No

88. Hogan v. Newfoundland

27865

No

89. Nova Scotia v. Walsh

28179

Yes

90. Archibald v. Canada

28116

No

91. Moffatt v. Canada

27895

No

92. Vachon c. Société
d’aménagement

28098

No

93. Nova Scotia v. Martin &
Laseur
94. Scheuneman v. Canada

28370

No

28344

No

95. Weeks v. Canada

28421

No

96. McLean v. Canada

28498

No

28166

No

28416

No

99. Irshad v. Ontario

28571

No

100. Bauman v. Nova Scotia

28619

No

2001-2002 Term (2 of 9 granted)
97. Théroux c. Commission
Scolaire
98. Siemens v. Manitoba

(2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d)

Dismissed,
6 Sep. 2001
Granted, 13
Sep. 2001
Dismissed,
13 Sep.
2001
Dismissed,
13 Sep.
2001

Result of
Appeal to
SCC on
Section 15
Claim
-

-

Allowed
-

-

-

Allowed
-

-

-

Dismissed
-

-

(2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d) MANAGING CHARTER EQUALITY RIGHTS

Case Name

SCC
Case
Number

Section
15 Claim
Est’d at
CA?

Result of
Leave
Application

Granted, 8
Nov. 2001
Dismissed,
7 Dec.
2001
Dismissed,
21 Feb.
2002
Dismissed,
25 Jun.
2002
Dismissed,
11 Jul.
2002

101. Trociuk v. British
Columbia
102. Westmount c. Quebec

28726

No

28869

No

103. Krock v. Canada

28740

No

104. Ayangma v. Prince Edward
Isand

29002

No

105. H. (B.) v. Alberta

29174

No

2002-2003 Term (6 of 15 granted)
106. CFCYL v. Canada

29113

No

107. Collins v. Canada

29189

No

108. Ent. W.F.H. Ltée. c.
Quebec

28978

No

109. Deol v. Canada

29371

No

110. Falkiner v. Ontario

29294

Yes

111. Hodge v. Canada

29351

Yes

112. Brebric v. Niksic

29388

No

113. Webb v. Waterloo Police
S.B.

29397

No

114. Miller v. Canada

29501

No

Granted, 17
Oct. 2002
Dismissed,
24 Oct.
2002
Dismissed,
12 Dec.
2002
Dismissed,
20 Feb.
2003
Granted, 20
Mar. 2003
Granted, 20
Mar. 2003
Dismissed,
20 Mar.
2003
Dismissed,
20 Mar.
2003
Dismissed,
17 Apr.
2003

547

Result of
Appeal to
SCC on
Section 15
Claim
Allowed
-

-

-

-

Dismissed
-

-

-125
Allowed
-

-

-

125
After leave was granted in Falkiner v. Ontario, a notice of discontinuance was filed. See
[2002] S.C.C.A. No. 297.
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Case Name

SCC
Case
Number

Section
15 Claim
Est’d at
CA?

Result of
Leave
Application

Granted, 24
Apr. 2003
Dismissed,
24 Apr.
2003
Dismissed,
24 Apr.
2003
Granted, 15
May 2003
Granted, 5
Jun. 2003
Dismissed,
17 Jul.
2003

115. Gosselin (Tutor of) v.
Quebec
116. Mack v. Canada

29298

No

29475

No

117. McFadyen v. Canada

29591

No

118. Auton v. British Columbia

29508

Yes

119. Newfoundland v. N.A.P.E.

29597

No

120. Canada v. Lesiuk

29642

No

2003-2004 Term (0 of 7 granted)
121. Chippewas of Nawash v.
Canada

29568

No

122. Bear v. Canada

29666

No

123. Taylor v. Canada

29678

No

124. MacKay v. B.C.

29765

No

125. Power v. Canada

29886

No

126. Burnett v. British Columbia

29987

No

127. C.S.N. c. Québec

30069

No

2004-2005 Term (2 of 6 granted)
128. Fitzgerald v. Alberta
30453

No

129. R. v. Mackenzie

No

30359

(2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d)

Dismissed,
18 Sep.
2003
Dismissed,
18 Sep.
2003
Dismissed,
25 Sep.
2003
Dismissed,
25 Sep.
2003
Dismissed,
22 Jan.
2004
Dismissed,
26 Feb.
2004
Dismissed,
1 April
2004
Dismissed,
6 Jan. 2005
Dismissed,
3 Feb. 2005

Result of
Appeal to
SCC on
Section 15
Claim
Dismissed
-

-

Allowed
Dismissed
-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

(2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d) MANAGING CHARTER EQUALITY RIGHTS

Case Name

SCC
Case
Number

Section
15 Claim
Est’d at
CA?

Result of
Leave
Application

130. Health Services v. B.C.

30554

No

131. Simser v. Canada

30746

No

132. Canada v. Hislop

30755

Yes

133. R. v. Schneider

30761

No

Granted, 21
April 2005
Dismissed,
23 June
2005
Granted, 23
June 2005
Dismissed,
25 Aug.
2005

2005-2006 Term (1 of 7 granted)
134. BCGEU v. B.C.
30925

No

135. Kempling v. B.C.C. of
Teachers

31088

No

136. Manoli v. Canada

31039

No

137. R. v. Hy and Zel’s Inc.

31287

No

138. Arishenkoff v. B.C.

31251

No

139. Baier v. Alberta

31526

No

140. Métis N.C. of Women v.
Canada

31421

No

2006-2007 Term (2 of 5 granted)
141. R. v. C. (J.)
31406

Yes

142. Wetzel v. Canada

31453

No

143. R. v. Kapp

31603

No

144. R. v. Banks

31929

No

Dismissed,
22 Sept.
2005
Dismissed,
19 Jan.
2006
Dismissed,
9 Feb. 2006
Dismissed,
30 Mar.
2006
Dismissed,
27 April
2006
Granted, 28
July 2006
Dismissed,
17 Aug.
2006
Dismissed,
14 Sept.
2006
Dismissed,
12 Oct.
2006
Granted, 14
Dec. 2006
Dismissed,
23 Aug.
2007

549

Result of
Appeal to
SCC on
Section 15
Claim
Dismissed
-

Dismissed
-

-

-

-

-

Dismissed
-

-

-

Dismissed
-
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Case Name

SCC
Case
Number

(2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d)

Section
15 Claim
Est’d at
CA?

Result of
Leave
Application

145. Ermineskin Indian Band v.
31875
Cda
2007-2008 Term (2 of 13 granted)
146. Melanson v. New Bruns32008
wick

No

Granted, 30
Aug. 2007

No

147. C. (A.) v. Manitoba

31955

No

148. Alberta v. Hutterian
Brethren
149. Howe v. Canada

32186

Yes

32198

No

150. Tomasson v. Canada

32298

No

151. APPQ c. Sûreté du Québec

32301

No

152. Zhang v. Canada

32209

No

153. Veffer v. Canada

32260

No

154. Moresby Explorers Inc. v.
Cda

32327

No

155. Soucy c. Québec

32406

No

156. Marchand v. Ontario

32455

No

157. Longley v. Canada

32459

No

158. Guzman v. Canada

32409

No

Dismissed,
20 Sept.
2007
Granted, 25
Oct. 2007
Granted, 29
Nov. 2007
Dismissed,
6 Dec.
2007
Dismissed,
24 Jan.
2008
Dismissed,
31 Jan.
2008
Dismissed,
7 Feb. 2008
Dismissed,
14 Feb.
2008
Dismissed,
21 Feb.
2008
Dismissed,
24 April
2008
Dismissed,
24 April
2008
Dismissed,
24 April
2008
Dismissed,
3 July 2008

2008-2009 Term (2 of 10 granted)
159. Giacomelli Estate v.
32690
Canada

No

Dismissed,
25 Sept.
2008

Result of
Appeal to
SCC on
Section 15
Claim
Dismissed

Dismissed
Allowed
-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

(2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d) MANAGING CHARTER EQUALITY RIGHTS

Case Name

SCC
Case
Number

Section
15 Claim
Est’d at
CA?

Result of
Leave
Application

160. Ross v. Charlottetown

32734

No

161. Ali v. Canada

32762

No

162. Sagharian v. Ontario

32753

No

163. Downey v. Nova Scotia

32822

No

164. Dodd v. Warden of I.M.H.

32845

No

165. Fraser v. Ontario

32968

No

166. Withler v. Canada

33039

No

167. Mullins v. Levy

33070

No

168. Harris v. Canada

33091

No

Dismissed,
23 Oct.
2008
Dismissed,
20 Nov.
2008
Dismissed,
4 Dec.
2008
Dismissed,
11 Dec.
2008
Dismissed,
18 Dec.
2008
Granted, 2
April 2009
Granted, 28
May 2009
Dismissed,
11 June
2009
Dismissed,
09 July
2009

2009-2010 Term126 (1 of 9 granted)
169. Boulter v. Nova Scotia
33124

No

170. Gill v. Canada

33144

No

171. McIvor v. Canada

33201

Yes

172. Morrow v. Zhang

33311

No

173. Sagen v. VANOC

33439

No

126

To July 31, 2010.

Dismissed,
10 Sept.
2009
Dismissed,
29 Oct.
2009
Dismissed,
5 Nov.
2009
Dismissed,
17 Dec.
2009
Dismissed,
22 Dec.
2009

551

Result of
Appeal to
SCC on
Section 15
Claim
-

-

-

-

-

Pending
Pending
-

-

-

-

-

-

-
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(2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d)

Case Name

SCC
Case
Number

Section
15 Claim
Est’d at
CA?

Result of
Leave
Application

174. R. v. Little

33390

No

175. Cunningham v. Alberta

33340

Yes

176. Hartling v. Nova Scotia

33572

No

177. Ray v. The Queen

33610

No

Dismissed,
14 Jan.
2010
Granted, 11
April 2010
Dismissed,
27 May
2010
Dismissed,
24 June
2010

Result of
Appeal to
SCC on
Section 15
Claim
-

Pending
-

-

